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ABSTRACT 
The new dynamical game theoretic model of sex ratio evolution emphasizes the role of males as 
passive carriers of sex ratio genes. This shows inconsistency between population genetic models 
of sex ratio evolution and classical strategic models. In this work a novel technique of change of 
coordinates will be applied to the new model. This will reveal new aspects of the modelled 
phenomenon which cannot be shown or proven in the original formulation. The underlying goal 
is to describe the dynamics of selection of particular genes in the entire population, instead of in 
the same sex subpopulation, as in the previous paper and earlier population genetics approaches. 
This allows for analytical derivation of the unbiased strategic model from the model with 
rigorous non-simplified genetics. In effect, an alternative system of replicator equations is 
derived.  It contains two subsystems: the first describes changes in gene frequencies (this is an 
alternative unbiased formalization of the Fisher-Dusing argument), whereas the second describes 
changes in the sex ratios in subpopulations of carriers of genes for each strategy. An intriguing 
analytical result of this work is that the fitness of a gene depends on the current sex ratio in the 
subpopulation of its carriers, not on the encoded individual strategy. Thus, the argument of the 
gene fitness function is not constant but is determined by the trajectory of the sex ratio among 
carriers of that gene. This aspect of the modelled phenomenon cannot be revealed by the static 
analysis. Dynamics of the sex ratio among gene carriers is driven by a dynamic "tug of war" 
between female carriers expressing the encoded strategic trait value and random partners of male 
carriers expressing the average population strategy (a primary sex ratio). This mechanism can be 
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called "double-level selection”. Therefore, gene interest perspective leads to multi-level 
selection. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Sex ratio evolution is one of the basic examples of evolutionary mechanisms that are presented in 
every course on evolutionary biology. The first approach to this problem was presented by 
German biologist Carl Dusing [2]. Historically, it was the first application of mathematical 
modeling to evolutionary phenomena. Dusing argued that the fitness of females using different 
sex ratio strategies can be described by the number of their grandoffspring. A similar approach 
was applied by Fisher and Shaw and Mohler [3, 4, 5]. This is also an important example in 
evolutionary game theory, known as a sex ratio game [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. The general prediction 
of this approach is that the sex ratio of 0.5 is evolutionarily stable. However, there is an 
alternative approach to the modeling of sex ratio evolution related to population genetics [5, 12, 
13, 14]. This approach is focused on tracing the genes encoding sex ratio strategies. Those 
models predict a stable structure of the population describing gene frequencies among males and 
females and a sex ratio as the effect of expression of those genes. Therefore, there is a major 
difference between the strategic phenotypic approach and genetic modeling [15, 16, 17]. The 
phenotypic approach describes the mean female strategy of 0.5 as evolutionarily stable, while 
genetic models show that the composition of the male population can also matter. To analyze this 
problem, in our previous paper [1], a new model of sex ratio evolution was developed. The new 
approach is an attempt to combine the genetic and phenotypic approach and to overcome the 
limitations of both of them. The goal was to solve the problem of different predictions and to 
obtain a coherent picture of the modeled phenomenon. 
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The new model focuses on the global dynamics of the system, and its structure resembles the 
genetic approach [5, 12, 13, 14].  Whereas the classical Dusing-Fisher-Shaw-Mohler (DFSM) 
model is focused on the reproductive success of individual strategies carried by female strategic 
agents (as in Dusing’s paper, see [2], or the sex ratio game) or some undescribed group of 
“parents” (as in [3, 4], more on this topic in section 4.2). For a closer understanding of the 
relations between the classical and the new approach, the selection of individual strategies 
resulting from global dynamics must be analyzed, which is the subject of this paper.  
In this paper a novel technique of change of coordinates will be applied to the model from [1]. 
This will reveal new aspects of the modelled phenomenon which cannot be shown or proven in 
the original formulation. Similarly the results from [1] will be hard to show in the new 
coordinates, thus the two papers complement each other. The underlying goal is to describe the 
dynamics of selection of particular genes in the entire population, instead of in the same sex 
subpopulation as in the previous paper and earlier population genetics approaches. In effect, an 
unbiased strategic model will be analytically derived from the non-simplified rigorous genetic 
model. 
 Thus, the classical strategic approach analyzes the reproductive success of a female, while the 
genetic approach traces gene frequencies in the population. Therefore, what happens when we 
combine both perspectives and assume that the gene is the strategic agent? 
METHODS 
 Now we shall recall the structure of the new model (see Table 1 for the list of symbols). Section 
1 can be skipped by readers familiar with paper [1]. 
1.1 Summary of basic formal details of the new model 
 There are u  individual strategies described by ]1,0[iP , the proportion of male offspring of a 
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female playing strategy iP . There are ix  females and iy  male carriers of the strategy iP  in the 
population. Therefore, the population consists of ii xx   females and ii yy   males. Thus, 
],...,[ 1 ufff   is the vector of frequencies of strategies of the female subpopulation, and 
],...,[ 1 ummm   is an analogous vector for the male subpopulation, where 
x
x
f ii   and 
y
y
m ii  . 
xy
y
P

  is the fraction of males in the population (the secondary sex ratio), and jjj Pf  is the 
mean female strategy (the primary sex ratio).  Assume that each female produces k  offspring 
according to haploid inheritance. However, males are gene carriers too, and transfer those genes 
to their offspring with the probability 0.5. The influence of males can be described by the fitness 
exchange effect (i.e. daughters of male carriers contribute to the fitness of female carriers and 
sons of female carriers contribute to the fitness of male carriers). In [1] it was shown that 
 
y
xk
PfW jjjmm  5.0  is the expected number of male offspring, and   
y
xk
PfW jjjmf  15.0  
is the expected number of female offspring of the male individual. Analogously, 
kPW ifm )1(5.0   is the expected number of male offspring, and kPW iff 5.0  is the expected 
number of female offspring of the female individual playing the strategy iP . Therefore, the 
following equations were obtained: 
 







  i
i
i
jjjfm
i
i
mmim P
m
f
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P
P
kW
y
x
WmfPPW
2
1
),,,(  ,                                         (1) 
– payoff function of the males carrying the strategy iP ,      
      





 jjj
i
i
imf
i
i
ffif Pf
f
m
P
k
W
x
y
WmfPPW 11
2
,,, ,                                          (2) 
– payoff function of the females playing the strategy iP  . 
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Now we have all elements needed to formulate multipopulation replicator dynamics (see 
appendix A). In [1], this took the following form: 
   mfPWmfPPWff fifii ,,),,,(        for  )1,...,1(  ui ,  
   mfPWmfPPWmm mimii ,,),,,(       for  )1,...,1(  ui ,  
   mfPWmfPWPP m ,,),,(  , 
 
where ),,,(),,( mfPPWmmfPW imiim  ,    mfPPWfmfPW ifiif ,,,,,  ,  
   mfPWPmfPWPmfPW fm ,,)1(),,(,,   are the respective average payoff functions of 
the male, female and the whole population. This leads to the following system of equations: 
   











 jjji
i
i
i
i Pff
m
P
f
kf 1
2
1
2
       for  )1,...,1(  ui ,          
  jjjiiii PfmPfP
Pk
m 




 

1
2
                    for  )1,...,1(  ui ,                   
  PPfPkP jjj  )1( .                                         
It was shown that, for biological reasons, we can limit the analysis of the model to values of 
primary and secondary sex ratios over the interval )1,0( .  
 
1.2 Summary of predictions of  the new model 
An analysis of the behavior of this model shows that two phases of convergence can be 
distinguished. The first, rapid phase occurs when the secondary sex ratio P  converges to the 
current value of the primary sex ratio jjj Pf , and the male subpopulation converges to the state 
termed the male subpopulation equilibrium (MSE), described by the condition jjjiii PfmPf  . 
During the second phase of convergence, the primary sex ratio converges to the value 0.5, and the 
value of the secondary sex ratio follows these changes to maintain equality. In addition, the state 
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of the male subpopulation changes to maintain the MSE.  
RESULTS 
2. Reformulation of the model. 
In the previous paper [1], a change in the coordinates (described in appendix A) was applied to 
the numerical solutions obtained to calculate the frequencies of all types of individuals (see Fig. 
3c in [1] and section 3.2 there) and gene frequencies (see Fig. 6 in [1] and section 4 there). 
However, this method can be applied not only to numerical solutions, but also directly to 
replicator equations. In this way, we can reformulate the new model to focus on changes in gene 
frequencies. We have iPm  male carriers and   ifP1  female carriers of a strategy iP  in the 
whole population. Thus, the frequency of carriers of a gene which encodes this strategy is equal 
to: 
   iii fPPmG  1 .           (3) 
The state of the population can be described by the vector uuGGG  ],...,[ 1 , where 1 jj G . In 
this description, there is no information about the sex of the carriers of these genes. We can fill 
this gap by adding information about the sex ratio in the subpopulation of the carriers for every 
gene: 
 
i
i
ii
i
i
G
Pm
fPPm
Pm
M 


)1(
     -proportion of males among carriers of iP ,  
(4)  
i
i
ii
i
ii
G
fP
fPPm
fP
MF
)1(
)1(
)1(
1




     -proportion of females among carriers of iP .  
Then, ],...,[ 1 uMMM   is the vector of subpopulation sex ratios. Therefore, this structure can be 
treated as a division of the entire population into u  subgroups with one-dimensional 
subpopulation states. Then, according to the general notation from appendix A, i
i M  and 
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jj G  (see also [18]), the structure of the space of population states will take the form 
presented in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Scheme of a space of population states in the new formulation of the model. In this case, it is a product 
of a simplex of gene frequencies and u  one-dimensional simplexes that describe sex ratios in the 
subpopulations of carriers for each strategy. 
 
 Note that in the previous formulation of the model, the space of population states was the 
product of two 1u  dimensional simplexes of the male and female subpopulation and a one-
dimensional simplex of the proportion between these subpopulations (a secondary sex ratio); in 
general, the dimension of the whole space was 12 u . In the new formulation, this space consists 
of one 1u  dimensional simplex of gene frequencies and u  one-dimensional simplexes of 
subpopulation sex ratios, and the dimension of the whole space of population states is also 
12 u . Therefore, the dimension of the space of population states is invariant in response to the 
change of coordinates, which is consistent with the fact that we have a different parameterization 
of the same phase space. We can describe important population parameters in the new 
coordinates for parameters such as the mean female subpopulation strategy prP , i.e., the primary 
sex ratio and secondary sex ratio (among adult individuals) P : 
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 jjjjjjjpr PGMP
PfP )1(
1
1


      and jjj MGP  .   
   
The average fitness functions from the previous paper (recalled in section 1.1) were: 
 jjjm PfP
P
kmfPW 


1
),,(     – mean fitness of the male subpopulation, 
    jjjf PfkmfPW  1,,          – mean fitness of the female subpopulation, 
   )1(,, PkmfPW                   – mean fitness of the whole population. 
Then, we can derive the mean payoff to the carrier of a gene for strategy iP  (for a full derivation 
see appendix B): 
 ),,,()1(),,,(),,(),,,( mfPPWMmfPPWMMGPWmfPPW ifiimiigig  ,  
 
which takes the form: 
 
      iiiiig MM
k
MM
P
Pk
MGPW 







 1
2
1
1
2
),,( ,                        (5) 
where 
P
P

1
 is the number of females per single male individual. For the new coordinates we 
obtain the following replicator equations (for a detailed derivation, see appendix C): 
  ),,(),,,( mfPWmfPPWGG igii           -dynamics of gene frequencies, 
 
  ),,,(),,,( mfPPWmfPPWMM igimii     -dynamics of sex ratios in carriers subpopulations, 
which take the form: 
 











 1
2
1
P
M
PkGG iii
             for )1,...,1(  ui ,                         (6) 
     










 
 iiiiprii MPMMP
P
P
M
k
M 1
1
2
        for ),...,1( ui  .            (7) 
3. Behavior of trajectories of replicator equations 
3.1 Trajectories of gene frequencies 
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Here, we will examine the dynamics of gene frequencies. The product 











 1
2
1
P
M
P i  is 
responsible for the sign of the right side of equation (6). When both coefficients are negative or 
positive, then their product is positive (the frequency of gene iP  increases), and when they have 
opposite signs, then their product will be negative (the frequency of gene iP  decreases). The zero 
points of these coefficients,
2
1
P  and iMP  , are stationary points of equation (6). Therefore, 
the dynamics of the gene frequencies can be described in the following way: 
 iG  increases when 
2
1
P  and iMP   or 
2
1
P  and iMP  ,  
 iG  decreases when iM
2
1
P  or 
2
1
 PM i ,                            (8) 
 iG  is constant when 0iG  or PM i    or 
2
1
P . 
Recall that jjj MGP  , which means that the secondary sex ratio is equal to the average sex 
ratio in the carrier subpopulation over the entire population. Therefore, the frequency iG  
decreases when the sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation iM  is shifted farther from 0.5 than the 
mean sex ratio in the carrier subpopulations for all strategies P . In the opposite case, iG  will 
increase. This mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 2a. Therefore, the frequency of a gene that encodes 
the strategy 0.5 increases when the sex ratio in a subpopulation of its carriers is closer to 0.5 than 
the current value of the secondary sex ratio; this frequency decreases in the opposite case. A 
situation in which the secondary sex ratio is equal to 0.5 is the stationary state of the dynamics of 
gene frequencies (6). Therefore, this mechanism described by (8) is independent of individual 
strategies Pi, but its dynamics are dependent on the trajectories of the sex ratios in the 
subpopulations of carriers of the strategies described by Mi.  
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Fig. 2 Trajectories of a population of individuals with strategies for sex ratios of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 for initial 
conditions M0.2=0.81, M0.5=0.01, M0.8=0.33 and G0.2=0.21, G0.5=0.73, G0.8=0.06.  Panel a) shows the trajectories 
of gene frequencies iG , Therefore, iG  increases when 
2
1
P   and  iMP    or  
2
1
P   and  iMP   and 
decreases when 
2
1
P   and  iMP    or  
2
1
P   and iMP  . This mechanism is clearly shown in the 
trajectories of strategy 0.5. The trajectory 5.0G  switches from a decrease to an increase when trajectory of 
5.0M  passes the trajectory of P  (see panel b). Panel b) shows the respective changes of sex ratios in carrier 
subpopulations iM . Note that sex ratios in carrier subpopulations rapidly converge to the values determined 
by the MSE phenomenon, and after that, they follow the changes of the primary sex ratio prP  that slowly 
converges to 0.5. The sex ratio among carriers of male biased strategies change due to the dynamics of the 
primary sex ratio while among female biased strategies, it converges to the neighbourhood of the value 
encoded by the gene. 
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Note that parameter Mi also affects the secondary sex ratio jjj MGP  , modifying the values 
of jG . However, sex ratios in carrier subpopulations jM  are determined by mechanisms acting 
at the level of carrier subpopulations that are described in the next section. 
 
 
3.2 Trajectories of sex ratios in subpopulations of carriers 
The dynamics of sex ratios in the carrier subpopulations are more sophisticated. The right side of 
equation (7) contains two coefficients:  ipr MP   and  ii MP  , weighted by current values of 
iM  and  iM1 . These coefficients are responsible for the direction of convergence. The 
coefficient  ipr MP   induces attraction of iM  to prP , and the coefficient  ii MP   causes 
attraction of iM  to iP . This is, in a sense, a tug of war between female partners of the male 
carriers (representing average strategy prP ) and female carriers of the same gene (representing 
encoded strategy iP ). As we can see in Fig. 2b, the shape of the trajectory of a 0.8 sex ratio 
strategy that produces mostly sons is almost parallel to the trajectory of parameter P , which is 
equal to prP  in the slow phase of convergence (see [1]). On the other hand, the trajectory of a 0.2 
sex ratio strategy that produces more daughters is closer to the constant function 0.2 than to the 
trajectory of P . Thus, the Mi value of the strategies producing (and in effect carried by) mostly 
males resemble trajectories of the primary sex ratio, while female biased strategies have Mi 
almost constant and equal to Pi . This interesting aspect would be hard to show by static analysis.  
Below, we will characterize equilibrium in this "tug of war". 
Lemma 1 
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a) For every set of values of P , )1,0(prP  and ]1,0(iP , dynamics (7) has the unique 
stable conditional equilibrium iM  that is contained in the interval limited by the values of 
prP  and iP .  
b) For the strategy 0iP , there is one stationary point, 0iM , which is stable when 
unique. However, when 


1
prP  and 2
1P , the rest point 0iM  becomes unstable, and 
there exists a second stationary point 
1
1



pr
i
P
M . 
 
For a proof, see Appendix D. 
 
Lemma 1 indicates that, at every moment, there exists some attracting point for Mi lying between 
the current value of the primary sex ratio prP  (which also changes in time) and the value of 
individual strategy Pi. By this dynamic equilibrium, the expression of individual strategies 
determines the parameter Mi. The only exception is strategy 0iP  (production of female 
offspring only) for which the second stationary state may exist during the rapid phase  
of convergence. It was impossible to analytically derive the stable sex ratio in the carrier 
subpopulations, in the general case. This is possible only when the population is in the MSE state 
and will be presented in a subsequent paper devoted to the MSE. According to Lemma 1, we can 
numerically approximate this value because it is unique in these biologically significant cases.  
DISCUSSION 
4.1. The mechanism of "double-level" selection 
Here, we will summarize the results we have obtained. The first intriguing analytical result of the 
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reformulated model is that the fitness function of a gene (5) is independent of the individual 
strategy it encodes. Proliferation of a given gene depends on the current sex ratio in the 
subpopulation of its carriers iM . Note that the fitness function (5) is a good mathematical 
description of Fisher's idea, which is related to the reproductive value of carriers with different 
sexes according to the deviation of the secondary sex ratio P. It suggests that males are 
reproductively more efficient when they are in the minority (P<1/2), because each male can mate 
with several females (Γ>1). On the other hand, females are more efficient when they are in the 
minority (P>1/2), because each female will be expected to produce offspring, and there are not 
enough mates for all males (Γ<1). Therefore, parameter iM  describes the proportion of carriers 
with the more reproductively efficient sex among all carriers of a gene. This fitness function 
explicitly considers male carriers from the mother’s generation of unexpressed sex ratio genes. 
Function (5) can be transformed in the following way (recall that iy  is the number of male 
carriers, and ix  is the number of female carriers, of the strategy iP ): 
    

















22
1
2
1
2
k
x
k
y
yxyx
x
yx
yk
MM
k
W ii
iiii
i
ii
i
iig  . 
This is the per capita normalized sum (averaged over the carriers subpopulation) of the offspring 
produced by female partners of male carriers described by 
2
k
yi  and offspring of female carriers 
described by 
2
k
xi  (where 
2
k
 is the number of offspring of a single female multiplied by the 
probability of gene transfer from the focal parent). This is an explanation of the importance of 
male carriers of the unexpressed sex ratio genes, or rather their female partners. Their role is 
important, because each male carrier may have   partners, and the activity of their partners is an 
important component of gene fitness. Surprisingly, this function is independent of the value of a 
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given strategy, iP , encoded by the carried gene. It depends only on   and iM . The phenomenon 
can be termed double level selection. The fitness of a gene that encodes an individual strategy is 
determined in some way by the current sex ratio in its carrier subpopulation and the secondary 
sex ratio in the population as a whole. Values of both parameters may be perturbed. However, the 
stable carrier subpopulation sex ratio should be determined in some way by the value of the 
encoded strategy (Fig. 3). This is a newly discovered mechanism. In general, the mechanism of 
double level selection can be regarded as an example of multi-level selection, which is the 
concept presented by [19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. The classical approach to the modeling of sex ratio 
evolution treats this phenomenon as single level selection, which means that the fitness is 
unambiguously determined by the values of individual strategy iP  and a population state 
described by the secondary sex ratio (Fig. 3). In the next subsection, a higher level of this process 
will be considered.  
 
 
Fig. 3. A comparison of "single level" selection and "double level" selection. 
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4.2 Dynamics of gene frequencies 
 
The mechanism realized by gene frequency replicator equations (6), described by the rules (8) 
increases the frequency of a gene for which the value of a parameter iM  is greater/smaller than 
the secondary sex ratio P (which is equal to the average M in the population) when  P is 
smaller/greater than 0.5. Thus, it is profitable for the gene to be carried by that sex which is 
currently in the minority. There is an interesting relationship between the mechanism described 
by (8) and the replicator dynamics paradigm. In standard replicator equations, frequencies of 
strategies change according to the sign of the deviation of their fitness from average fitness 
(minus - decrease, plus - increase). If fitness depends linearly on a particular trait, then selection 
works according to deviations from the average trait value. Note that the payoff function (5) is 
linear with respect to the parameter (trait) Mi, and the secondary sex ratio P is an average Mi over 
the population. The difference between the mechanism in rules (8) and standard replicator 
dynamics is that parameter iM  is not a description of a fixed individual strategy but of the 
current state of a subgroup of individuals (the subpopulation of carriers of strategy iP ). Dusing 
classically argued that female producing offspring of the sex that is currently in the minority will 
have more grand-offspring. This argument states that there are differences in fitness among 
females with different strategies, which is considered a proof of the existence of selection on 
individual strategies. However, our new model shows that a mechanism based on different 
reproductive values is independent of individual strategies iP , and it affects the primary sex ratio 
prP  and the secondary sex ratio P  (which is equal to the average sex ratio in the carrier 
subpopulation) by changing only gene frequencies jG . In [3], the following statement can be 
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found: 
"...it would follow that those parents, the innate tendencies of which caused them to produce 
males in excess, would for the same expenditure, produce a greater amount of reproductive 
value; and in consequence would be the progenitors of a larger fraction of future generations…". 
Therefore, Fisher in his original reasoning considered a group of individuals that adjusts the sex 
ratio among its members due to genetic mechanisms. However, the mechanisms for this 
adjustment were not explicitly explained. The perspective of a group adjusting the sex ratio 
among its members is also assumed by [4]. However, they also presented only a conjecture that 
the sex ratio is completely heritable within the group, without an explanation of how it is 
realized. Therefore, there is a difference between Fisher's reasoning that operated on the level of 
the subpopulation of all carriers of a gene and Dusing's approach related to the level of female 
individuals. The female perspective is not sufficient, especially for male-biased strategies, which 
will produce more male than female carriers. This means that the Fisherian argument about the 
different reproductive values of males and females is an important part of understanding sex ratio 
self-regulation. However, it is not enough for a full mechanistic explanation of this process. 
Therefore, we should investigate how the expression of individual strategies determines the sex 
ratio in the carrier subpopulation iM . This will allow us to overcome the limitations of Dusing’s 
reasoning, which considers only female reproductive success and disregards the role of male gene 
carriers from the same generation. 
 
4.3 Dynamics of sex ratios in carrier subpopulations: the "tug of war" mechanism 
The sex ratio in carrier subpopulations is the effect of intrinsic dynamics that can be compared to 
a "tug of war" between iP  and prP . It was proved in Lemma 1 that for every population state 
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there exists a single unique attractor of Mi dynamics contained in the interval that is limited by 
values of prP  and iP . Let us describe the "tug of war" metaphor in a more formal way. The right-
hand side of replicator equation (7) is proportional to 
     iiiipri MPMMP
P
P
M 




 
1
1
.  
The factor 




 
P
P
M i
1
 that is the weight of  ipr MP   can be written as 
ii
i
yx
y


 and the 
proportion )1( iM that is the weight of  ii MP   equals 
ii
i
yx
x

. Thus the right side of this 
equation is proportional to 
     iiiipri
ii
MPxMPy
yx


1
.  
Since   is the number of females per single male, then iy  is also the number of female partners 
of male carriers of gene encoding the strategy iP . These females "pull the rope" toward the value 
of prP . On the other side, a team of ix  female carriers of this gene "pulls the rope" toward the 
value iP . It is evident here that the expression of strategies of parental individuals determines the 
fate of their descendants, by the setting of the sex ratio among them. 
4.5 An unresolved problem: the role of the male subpopulation equilibrium 
Recall that, during the slow phase of the sex ratio dynamics, PPpr  . Note that, if in rules (8) we 
substitute prP  instead of P  and if  instead of iM  we obtain the following rules: 
 if  increases when 2
1 jjj Pf   and ijjj PPf     or   2
1 jjj Pf   and ijjj PPf  , 
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 if  decreases when 2
1 jjji PfP    or   2
1 jjji PfP ,            
 if  is stable when: 0if   or  1if   or  jjji PfP  . 
These describe the changes of a female subpopulation state when the MSE condition is satisfied 
(Lemma 1 from [1]). This leads to the problem of the role of the MSE phenomenon, which is 
responsible for the rapid phase of convergence and the dynamics of sex ratios in the carrier 
subpopulations. The first idea that comes to mind to explain this phenomenon is that the male 
subpopulation equilibrium is equivalent to some stable sex ratio in the carrier subpopulation (the 
equilibrium of the "tug of war" mechanism), which is conditional on current values of prPP,  and 
iP . The rapid phase will then be equivalent to convergence to this stable value. When the 
subpopulation reaches a stable sex ratio, then it simply follows changes of the primary (and in 
effect the secondary) sex ratio, which are equivalent to the slow phase of convergence. 
Unfortunately, this idea is false. As shown in [1], when the MSE conditions are satisfied for all 
strategies, then all males in the population have the same fitness. If we assume that carrier 
subpopulations are in their stable states, then for all strategies females will have fitness equal to 
males. So, when all males have equal fitness, and all females have fitness equal to males, then all 
individuals in the population have equal fitness. In this case, the population would be in a global 
stationary state, which is not true. The nature and role of the male subpopulation equilibrium are 
the subjects of a subsequent paper. 
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Table 1: List of important symbols: 
classical theory: 
P  - secondary sex ratio 
 indP  - individual strategy interpreted as the mean sex ratio in the brood of a single female, 
which is the carrier of this strategy ( P  with index denotes the individual strategy) 
N- population size  
k  - mean brood size of a single female 
    mfPPWfmfPW ifiif ,,,,,    - mean fitness function of the female subpopulation 
    mfPWPmfPWPmfPW fm ,,)1(),,(,,    - mean fitness function of the whole 
population 
),( PPW ind  - classical Dusing-Fisher-Shaw-Mohler fitness function 
new model: 
 y   - number of males 
 x   - number of females 
xyN    - population size 
u   - number of individual strategies 
 
x
x
f ii    - frequency of females with strategy  iP   
 
y
y
m ii     frequency of males with strategy  iP   
 ],...,[ 1 ufff    -state vector of the female subpopulation 
 ],...,[ 1 ummm   -state vector  of the male subpopulation 
],...,[ 1 uGGG   - state vector of the gene pool 
  iii fPPmG  1 - frequency of a gene which encodes the strategy iP  
ii
i
i
fPPm
Pm
M
)1( 
  fraction of males in the subpopulation of carriers of the strategy iP  
 
xy
y
P

   - frequency of males in the population 
P
P
y
x 

1
   - number of females per single male individual 
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 jjjpr PfP     -primary sex ratio (mean strategy in the female subpopulation) 
 ),,,( mfPPW im   - males’ payoff function 
  mfPPW if ,,,   - females’ payoff function 
),,( MGPW ig - fitness function of a gene which encodes strategy iP  
 ),,,(),,( mfPPWmmfPW imiim    - mean fitness function of the male subpopulation 
 
 
Appendix A 
Change of coordinates in the space of population states. 
Assume that we want to break down an entire population into z  subgroups. Define 
],...,[ 1
i
iu
ii ddd   as a vector of indices of strategies exhibited by individuals from the i -th 
subgroup ( },...,1{ ud ij  , iu  the number of strategies in the i -th subgroup). For example, the 
notation ]5,3,1[2 d  means that in the second subgroup, there are individuals with strategies 3,1  
and 5 . Every strategy should belong to a single unique subgroup (and cannot belong to two). 
Then, according to [18] using the following change of coordinates: 
 










 i
j
i
i
iu
i
j
i
i
i
i
d
u
j
d
d
u
j
d
u
ii





11
1 ,...,],...,[
1      for    zi ,...,1 ,                         (a1) 
we obtain the distribution of relative frequencies of strategies in the i -th subpopulation. The 
distribution of proportions between subpopulations has the form: 
  z
i
z
i d
u
id
u
iz    111 ,...,],...,[ 1
1 ,                                                              (a2) 
 
where i  is the proportion of the i -th subpopulation. Every decomposition into subpopulations 
can be reduced again to a single population model by the opposite change of coordinates 
),...,,( 1 z  where: 
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 ijid ij
  .                                                                                                      (a3) 
 Note that we can break down an entire population into z  subpopulations. When we apply the 
above transformations to replicator equations, we obtain a set of equations that describes the 
dynamics inside subpopulations (intraspecific dynamics, see [18]), which has the form: 
  iijijij WW   , where jW  is the fitness of the j - th strategy in the i - th subpopulation and 
iW  is the mean fitness in the i - th subpopulation, and a system that describes changes of relative 
sizes among subpopulations (interspecific dynamics) is: 
  WW sss   , where W  is the mean fitness in the whole population. 
When the set of strategies in each subpopulation is characterized by a vector of indices id , then 
the system of replicator equations will be: 
  )))(),...,(),((()))(),...,(),((,()()( 11 tttWtttPWtt ziz
d
i
j
i
j i
j
       for    
1,...,1  iuj   and    zi ,...,1 ,                                                                                              (a4) 
 
  )))(),...,(),((()))(),...,(),((()()( 11 tttWtttWtt zzsss      
 for  1,...,1  zs ,                                                                                                                 (a5) 
where )),...,,(,()( 11
z
d
s
i
u
i
s
s
i
s PWW     is the mean fitness in the s -th subpopulation. The 
argument of a fitness function is a set of relative frequencies of all individuals   (without 
division into subpopulations), therefore the opposite change of coordinates ),...,,( 1 z  (a3) 
should be applied ([18]). In practical applications of this method to the modeling of biological 
problems, replicator equations can be defined for broken down populations. This break down will 
simplify the formulation of the model because, when strategies are initially assigned to 
subpopulations, there is no need to change their indices. The choice of subpopulations is arbitrary 
and depends on the biological assumptions underlying the analyzed problem. The entire 
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population may be divided into two competing subpopulations of carriers and parasites or 
predators and prey. It may also be divided into two subpopulations of males and females, in 
which case interspecific dynamics will describe the evolution of the secondary sex ratio, and 
intraspecific dynamics will describe changes of frequencies of strategies inside male and female 
subpopulations. The entire population can be divided into more than two subpopulations. The 
subpopulations can be divided into sub-subpopulations, and the entire population may be 
transformed into a complex multilevel cluster structure. However, all of these structures are 
equivalent to a single population replicator dynamics model. 
 
Appendix B 
Derivation of the fitness function of a gene  
  ),,,()1(),,,(),,(),,,( mfPPWMmfPPWMMGPWmfPPW ifiimiigig   
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The obtained formula should be described in new coordinates. Since: 
 
P
GM
m iii   and  
P
GM
f iii



1
)1(
,  
 
in effect we obtain: 
 
 
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
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= 







)1(
)1(
2
ii M
P
P
M
k
.  
 
Appendix C 
Alternative formulation of the replicator dynamics 
Derivation of replicator equations: 
 
a) Dynamics of gene frequencies (6): 
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b) Dynamics of sex ratios in carriers subpopulations (7): 
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Then equation iM
  has the form: 
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In effect, we obtain an alternative set of replicator equations (6) and (7). 
 
Appendix D 
Proof of  Lemma 1 
The equation of the sex ratio in the carrier subpopulations (7) can be denoted: 
      iiiiprii MPMMPM
k
M  1
2
 .     (d1) 
 
At the stationary point, the right side of the equation should be equal to zero. The right side of 
this equation is a square polynomial of parameter iM , then there exists at most two stationary 
points. Two terms are responsible for changing the direction of convergence:   ipr MP  and 
 ii MP   weighted by the current values of iM  and  iM1 . They are responsible for the 
attraction of iM  suitably toward prP  and iP . If the current value of iM  is smaller or larger than 
both values of prP  and iP , then both coefficients will have the same sign. If ipr PP  , then both 
coefficients cannot attain zero in the same point. ]1.0[iM , and so it is obvious that the point 
that will zero the right side of equation should be contained in the interval limited by values of 
prP  and iP , because the terms will have opposite signs. It is also obvious that two stationary 
points cannot exist in the interior of the interval [0,1], because one should be an attractor and the 
second a repeller. This implies the existence of a third stationary point, which will be an attractor 
in the interval limited by a repeller and a boundary of the set [0,1]. Otherwise, the trajectory will 
escape the unit interval. 
The interior has been analyzed. Thus we have to check the boundary of a set [0,1] where, the 
P a g e  | 27 
 
second stationary point, a repeller, may exist. This may be 0, when prP  or iP  is equal to 0, or 1, 
when prP  or iP  is equal 1.  Values of prP  from a boundary of [0,1] are not biologically relevant 
[1], therefore we have to review two cases: 
a) 1iP  and the possible restpoint 1iM . 
b) 0iP  and the possible restpoint 0iM . 
When we substitute 1iM  into a replicator equation iM
 , then iP  vanishes, and the right side of 
equation (7) has a negative value, so this point is not stationary.  
Thus, point a) is proven. 
In the second case, when we substitute 0iM  to the equation (d1), we obtain: 
 ii P
k
M
2
 ,  
 
which means that for 0iP , there exists a stationary point in the boundary. Then, in general, for 
0iP  equation (d1) takes the form: 
     iiprii MMPM
k
M  1
2
 .         (d2) 
 
Therefore, there are two cases, 0iM  and     01  iipr MMP , for which the right side of 
the equation can go to zero. The second stationary point is 
1
1



pr
i
P
M . Bracketed term in (d2) 
is negative with respect to M_i only for 1 , thus only in this case is iM   stable. So we must 
check the following condition: 
 1
1
1
0 



prP
.         (d3)  
 
Thus 1iM  for 1 when 1prP (relevant case) and for 1 when 1prP  (irrelevant case). 
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Thus, for the case 1 , condition 0iM  should be checked. This leads to the condition 


1
prP .  
After substitution of 
P
P

1
 into obtained conditions we obtain: 
 
P
P
Ppr


1
   and   
2
1P    
When we parameterize 
a
P
1
  where ),1( a , we obtain: 
 
aa
a
aPpr
1
1
1
1
1
1




  (which means PPpr  )  
 and 
  
2
1P   .  
So this phenomenon is structurally stable, however, it exists only when 
2
1
P  and parameter P  
is shifted from the current value of prP . This means that it may be observed only at the beginning 
of convergence to the male subpopulation equilibrium (a rapid phase). Which is the proof of 
point b). 
    
 
